SYSSEC: May 2010 Archives

 

May 30, 2010

LaTeX is, of course, the standard document production system for computer science documents (with a tiny minority using {t,n}roff). It's also a good example of one of the standard CS approach of solving problems by inventing a new programming language. Consider that designing a modern Web page involves using three separate languages, HTML, CSS, and JavaScript (of these only JavaScript is obviously Turing complete). As another example, when you print documents, you generate PDF or PostScript, which are just programming languages (PostScript is Turing complete, not sure about PDF)... Anyway, LaTeX is a bit too complete, it turns out.

Steve Checkoway, Hovav Shacham, and I have a paper at LEET describing how a malicious LaTeX file can compromise your computer:

We show that malicious TEX, BIBTEX, and METAPOST files can lead to arbitrary code execution, viral infection, denial of service, and data exfiltration, through the file I/O capabilities exposed by TEX's Turing-complete macro language. This calls into doubt the conventional wisdom view that text-only data formats that do not access the network are likely safe. We build a TEX virus that spreads between documents on the MiKTEX distribution on Windows XP; we demonstrate data exfiltration attacks on web-based LATEX previewer services.

This isn't just an issue of LaTeX files. While people do sometimes run LaTeX files prepared by others, generally those are only files you get from people you know, i.e., your collaborators. But it turns out you can also embed malicious code in BibTeX files, which people routinely copy and paste from totally untrusted sources (the BibTeX entry for this paper is here) in order to simplify reference management. The other major case is LaTeX class files, which people download for conference submission.

The good news is that the main threat is on Windows because LaTeX on UNIX is more restrictive about where you can write files. The bad news is that it's also an issue if you run Emacs (look, another embedded language!) with AucTeX (the best way to edit LaTeX files), AucTeX writes executable cache files in the local directory, so you're at risk.

Happy editing!

 

May 9, 2010

Henry Farrell over at Crooked Timber reports on having his laptop lost and then recovered. He then goes on to recommend a variety of precautions for future incidents:
Also - in the spirit of locking the barn door after the horse has gone but to your very great surprise been returned later through the benevolence of strangers - recommendations for minimizing the pain of stolen machines.

(1) Back Up Everything Important somewhere external. This is the one measure I did take - and the pain would have been far, far greater had I lost my work along with the machine. I use Sugarsync which keeps the work documents on my various machines in sync with each other as well as giving me an online back up - others swear by DropBox, SpiderOak and other services.

(2) Make sure that your account is password protected. I didn't do this - remarkably stupidly - but appear to have gotten away without loss of personal information. You shouldn't take this risk. I won't again.

(3) Set up a firmware password if you have a recently made Mac. Makes it much harder to wipe the OS.

(4) Consider buying anti-theftware like Undercover. Depending on your tolerance for risk, this may be too expensive for the benefits provided (me: my risk tolerance has decreased substantially since this happened to me).

(1) is of course good advice. Backups are good practice for a variety of threat models, including just plain hardware failure. I personally run backups and also keep most of my important stuff in a revision control (originally CVS but I'm moving over gradually to SVN).

Recommendation (2) is nowhere near strong enough. Passwords (barely) protect you against someone who has ephemeral physical access, but if you don't encrypt the hard drive, then a dedicated attacker can either boot up in repair mode (the BIOS password (#3) makes this more difficult) and read your data off or just pull the hard drive out. What you need here is disk encryption. Luckily, the Mac comes with FileValult: a quite serviceable (if a hair slow) disk encryption system.

Recommendation (4) makes some sense, though I doubt I would bother myself. I've never lost a laptop and when we multiply out the chance of loss times the chance of recovery and factor in the likelihood that your laptop will be covered by homeowner's insurance, I'm not sure that the $50 for Undercover is a good bet.