Software: September 2009 Archives

 

September 23, 2009

Nominum is introducing a new "cloud" DNS service called Skye. Part of their pitch for this service is that it's supposedly a lot more secure. Check out this interview with Nominum's John Shalowitz where he compares using their service to putting fluoride in the water:
In the announcement for Nominum's new Skye cloud DNS services, you say Skye 'closes a key weakness in the internet'. What is that weakness?

A: Freeware legacy DNS is the internet's dirty little secret - and it's not even little, it's probably a big secret. Because if you think of all the places outside of where Nominum is today - whether it's the majority of enterprise accounts or some of the smaller ISPs - they all have essentially been running freeware up until now.

Given all the nasty things that have happened this year, freeware is a recipe for problems, and it's just going to get worse.

...

What characterises that open-source, freeware legacy DNS that you think makes it weaker?

Number one is in terms of security controls. If I have a secret way of blocking a hacker from attacking my software, if it's freeware or open source, the hacker can look at the code.

By virtue of something being open source, it has to be open to everybody to look into. I can't keep secrets in there. But if I have a commercial-grade software product, then all of that is closed off, and so things are not visible to the hacker.

By its very nature, something that is freeware or open source [is open]. There are vendors that take a freeware product and make a slight variant of it, but they are never going to be ever able to change every component to lock it down.

Nominum software was written 100 percent from the ground up, and by having software with source code that is not open for everybody to look at, it is inherently more secure.

First, I should say that I don't have any position on the relative security of Nominum's software versus the various open source DNS products. With that said, I'm not really that convinced. The conventional argument goes that it's harder for attackers to find vulnerabilities in closed source software because it's harder to work with the binaries than the source. This is a proposition which I've seen vigorously argued but for which there isn't much evidence. Now, it's certainly true that if nobody can get access to your program at all, then it's much harder to figure out how it works and how to attack it. However, Nominum does sell DNS software, so unless the stuff they're running on Skye is totally different, it's not clear how much of an advantage this is.

Salowitz also argues that being closed source lets him hide "secret way[s] of blocking a hacker from attacking my software". This seems even less convincing, primarily because it's not really clear that such techniques exist; there's been a huge amount of work on software attack and defense in the public literature, so how likely is it that Nominum has really invented something fundamentally new? And if you did in fact have such a technique, but one that's only secure as long as it's secret, then it's far more vulnerable to reverse engineering than programs ordinarily are, since the attacker just needs to reverse engineer it once and it's insecure forever. By contrast, if they reverse engineer your program to find a vulnerability, you can close that vulnerability and then they need to find a new one.

Again, this isn't to say that Nominum's system is or isn't more secure than other DNS servers (though DJBDNS, for instance, has a very good reputation). I don't have any detailed information one way or the other. However, this particular argument doesn't seem to me to establish anything useful.