Initial notes on power grid attacks

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The WSJ reports that there has been significant penetration of the US power grid and other infrastructure networks:
The spies came from China, Russia and other countries, these officials said, and were believed to be on a mission to navigate the U.S. electrical system and its controls. The intruders haven't sought to damage the power grid or other key infrastructure, but officials warned they could try during a crisis or war.

"The Chinese have attempted to map our infrastructure, such as the electrical grid," said a senior intelligence official. "So have the Russians."


The U.S. electrical grid comprises three separate electric networks, covering the East, the West and Texas. Each includes many thousands of miles of transmission lines, power plants and substations. The flow of power is controlled by local utilities or regional transmission organizations. The growing reliance of utilities on Internet-based communication has increased the vulnerability of control systems to spies and hackers, according to government reports.

So, obviously this is bad.

The first question you should be asking at this point is why these infrastructure systems are connected to the Internet at all. Protecting a computer in an environment where the attacker is allowed to transmit arbitrary traffic is an extremely difficult problem. I'm not sure that anyone I know would feel comfortable guaranteeing that they could secure a computer under conditions of concerted attack by a dedicated attacker. This doesn't mean that nobody should ever connect their computer to the Internet. After all, it's not like the entire reources of some national intelligence agency are going to be trained on the server where your blog is hosted. But the situation is different with things like the electrical grid which are attractive national-scale attack targets. [And rumor in the system security community is that these targets are not that well secured.]

It's natural to set up a totally closed network with separate cables, fiber, etc., but I'm not sure how much that actually helps. If you're going to connect geographically distributed sites, then that's a lot of cable to protect, so you need to worry about attackers cutting into the cable at some point in the middle of nowhere and injecting traffic at that point. The next step is to use crypto: if you have point to point links then you can use simple key management between them and it's relatively simple to build hardware-based link encryptors which reject any traffic which wasn't protected with the correct key. Obviously you still need to worry about subversion of the encryptors, but it's a much harder attack target than subversion of a general purpose computer running some cort of crypto or firewall or whatever.

Unfortunately, this is only a partial answer because you still have to worry about what happens if one end of the link gets compromised. At that point, the attacker can direct traffic to the other end of the link, so we're back to the same problem of securing the end systems, but at least the attack surface is a lot smaller because someone first has to get into one of the systems. So, you need some kind of defense in depth where the end systems are hardened behind the link devices.

Ideally, of course, you wouldn't network these systems at all, but I suspect that's pretty much a nonstarter: the grid is pretty interdependent and the control networks probably need to be as well. Most likely the best we can do here is try to have as many airgaps and choke points as possible to try to make it hard to get into the system in the first place and then make it hard for malware to spread.

P.S. It's not a computer security issue per se, but it's worth observing that the electrical grids have non-computational cascading failure modes. See, for instance, the Wikipedia article on the 2003 blackout. This implies that even if you have excellent informational isolation, you still need to worry about localized informational attacks leading to large scale failures by propagation through the grid rather than propagation through the computer network.


Obviously the computer systems are not connected to the Internet. I thought everybody knew that. Even in the movie Live Free or Die Hard, the hackers needed direct physical access.

A much more plausible explanation of the "problem" is here:

Also, see Kevin Paulson's rant:

He's looking at who is the MESSENGER, which can also say alot.

This article seemed just too well timed, following up on government attempts to increase their power over computer networks.

Our electrical grid systems need to be fault-tolerant of other systems failing, as EKR alluded to in his last paragraph. Sooner or later one system is going to go down in a weird way.

This kind of runs into the "smart grid" problem. A grid that is "smart" is also a grid that is complex is also a grid that is corruptible.

(This is a domain where "hostile inputs" also includes a huge voltage surge.)

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