Estonia has been at the forefront of electronic voting for a number of years. In 2005 it started using a national ID card for authenticating voters and giving the go-ahead for using mobile phones is a continuation of that, according to Silver Meikar, a member of the Estonian Parliament and a longtime proponent of e-voting.
Voters will be authenticated using a digital certificate stored on SIM (Subscriber Identity Module) cards, which are already available to Estonians.
"You still need a computer and the Internet, but now you will have a choice of using your ID card plus card reader or a mobile ID to authenticate yourself," said Meikar.
Next on the agenda for the parlilament following last Thursday's decision to allow mobile-phone authentication is to adapt the Internet voting system, which currently only supports the use of ID cards. "We are now starting to program the system, so at the moment we don't have the technical readiness," said Vinkel. Adding support for mobile authentication will take about six months, he added.
In general, I think it's pretty fair to say that computer security researchers have a pretty negative view of Internet-based voting systems of this type, regardless of the authentication mechanism. This is a fairly complicated topic, but I wanted to try to explain some of the concerns.
First, it's important to be clear what sort of system we're talking about. There are a lot of ways to use the Internet for voting (results transmission, ballot distribution, registration, etc.) and I guess you could call any of them "Internet Voting". For the purposes of this post, however, I'm talking about a system where users vote on their own computers or mobile phones which then transmit the results over the Internet back to a central consolidation point. One example of such a system is Everyone Counts though I don't plan to talk about this system specifically.
There are a number of concerns with any system of this type. A nonexhaustive list would look something like this:
- How are voters authenticated?
- How do you prevent remote compromise of the tabulation system/EMS?
- How do you verify that your vote was correctly tabulated?
- How do you prevent remote compromise of the voter's terminal?
The voter authentication problem is probably the easiest to solve from a technical perspective. First, we understand how to do remote user authentication pretty well (though user interface and user compliance remain serious problems). It's certainly a lot easier if you can force all users to take some sort of authentication token, which seems to be the situation in Estonia. Moreover, the standards for voter authentication seem to be pretty low in any case. When I worked the polls in Santa Clara County, for instance, we were told we couldn't ask for identification unless the voter roll specifically told us to, which was more or less for first-time voters. Given this, it seems like you could use SSL with client certificates based on the smartcard. It's a little hard to tell how the Estonian system works, but it's probably something vaguely like this; given that it's based on cell phones, it might be AKA or some other 3G-type authentication system.
Remote Compromise of the EMS
Remote compromise of the EMS/tabulation system seems a lot more problematic. Pretty much by definition, there needs to be some Internet accessible server to receive your votes—otherwise it's not Internet voting. This means you need to worry about compromise of that server. How serious such compromise is depends on the way you've constructed your voting system. The naive way to build the system is as a sort of virtual DRE: users send their votes to the server which records them in memory, increments counters, etc. At the end of the election, you just spit out the votes and/or counter values. In such a system, compromise of the central server is extremely serious: an attacker can simply have the system output any election results of his choice. However, there are a variety of cryptographic mechanisms for building systems that are much more resistant to such attack, and in the limit don't require trusting the central server to deliver correct results at all. I'll talk about this very briefly under the next hed.
However, cryptographic voting systems don't provide a complete solution to the problem of server compromise. In particular, while they guarantee correct tabulation (for some value of guarantee), they don't guarantee availability. Consider what happens if the central server goes down on election night and nobody can record their vote. More creatively, an attacker could selectively block voting from specific individuals based on (for instance) their voter registration. Even if an anonymous authentication mechanism were used [technical note: for instance, certificates signed with blind signatures], an attacker could use IP identification and geolocation technology to get a pretty good idea of who voters were or at least where they were and thus selectively disenfranchise certain voters. Sure, in principle the voters could protest and maybe somehow get their votes to count (though this is much more complicated than it looks, since you have to worry about people who didn't vote on election day deciding retrospectively that they should have and then claiming they were denied service), but in practice how many would do so? So, denial of service is a real concern here.
Verifying Correct Tabulation
As I said above, it's possible to produce cryptographic systems which allow the demonstration of correct tabulation without requiring you to trust the tabulator. The details are complicated, but it's easy to see how to do it if you don't mind people's votes being published. You simply submit a digitally signed copy of your vote to the server. The server publishes all the signed votes. Once the election is over, you can verify that your vote was posted and that all the votes add up. Note that this mechanism is deeply flawed: for starters, it's generally not considered OK to post every vote. However, building a system with appropriate privacy guarantees is much harder and requires a fair bit more crypto.
I'm not an expert in cryptographic voting, but as far as I can tell, all the known systems have two major drawbacks. First, they require at least some fraction of voters to check that their votes are correctly recorded. It's not clear that voters will do this in practice. Note that the system I described above doesn't have that problem, but only because we've obliterated all the privacy guarantees. The second, more serious, problem is that they're complicated and convincing the average voter that they really prove what they are supposed to prove is extremely difficult. There's a fair amount of skepticism outside the crypto community about the degree to which the public at large is willing to trust systems that they don't really understand. [Note that one could argue that that's true of current computerized systems, but they are more familiar in operation and of course there is widespread distrust of such systems.]
Compromise of the Voter Terminal
Finally, we have to consider remote compromise of the voter's computer. Again, more or less by definition it's on the Internet, and personal computers are notoriously poorly maintained and vulnerable to attack (hence botnets). This threat is the hardest to secure against. A compromised terminal can present any information to the user it pleases. For instance, it could claim you're voting for Jefferson when actually you're voting for Burr. Even if afterwards you check your vote on some other computer and discover the fraud, there's no way for the electoral system to distinguish this from user error or buyer's remorse. As long as consumer operating systems remain as insecure as they currently are, it's pretty hard to see how to deal with this problem adequately.